Leverage Balochistan's opening for a reset with Iran
Jan Achakzai
On the horizon are three significant geo-political events unfolding which involve Iran with implications for Pakistan leading to a new imperative of pushing the reset button with Tehran.
First is the new opening up of Balochistan with Iran through its new road networks under CPEC, new border crossings, and new markets on the Iran Pakistan border. The second important development is the Chinese investment agreement of around $500 billion in Iran and also the strategic decision to work on Chabahar–India, which has some operational role in Chabahar has been effectively elbowed out for an eventual takeover of Chinese port company to run Chabahar like Gawadar port.
The third most important geopolitical shock is Iran's potential return to JCPOA and hence subsequent economic recovery and the foreign investment to follow. As Saudi-Iran and UAE-Iran detente has been achieved, it is in Pakistan's interest to revisit its Iran policy addressing all points irritating the ties between the two states. Recalibration will coincide when Pakistan would want Tehran’s supporting role (not spoiler’s role) in Afghanistan.
Pakistan particularly, the Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa has been very active to normalize relations with Iran since taking over: several high-level visits by him led to concrete progress on putting in place border management mechanisms in the past. The fencing of the border will likely be finished by the end of 2021.
Pakistan’s policymakers are very much convinced that Islamabad belongs to this region and it took more than 10 years to restore credibility in the eyes of Iran and Russia for forging close relations and for its quest to pivot to Euro-Asia.
Any attempt of undermining Iran means potentially undermining the Entente Cordiale, Pakistan pain strikingly achieved with Russia, and last but not the least upsetting China—which sees Iran as long term important friendly country to connect with its ambitious BRI project—is not in Pakistan’s interest; in other words, whatever concerns Pakistan may have with Iran, they may not be necessarily shared by China which has much bigger priorities as a rising world power.
Never kinetic operation by Islamabad against Iran gets approval on Iranian soil, a) when Pakistan itself is vulnerable [read Balochistan], b) having Iranian leverage against its second-largest Shia population and, c) Shia community has respectable representation at the top echelon of the inclusive Pakistan army forces.
The proximity factor also precludes doing any such operation next door to Pakistan’s Balochistan province (e.gSistan/Baluchistan) through sub nationalist Baloch militants still operate.
Balochistan and Iran's border has been used by militants on both sides threatening the peace of the two countries
The predecessor of the border-based anti-Iran militant outfit was neutralized by Pakistan's premier agency ISI and its leader Ragi was handed over to Iran.
And as Pakistan is trying to pull off Afghan reconciliation and many spoilers do not want to see Islamabad succeed when the Indian Intelligence Agency, RAW, is very much active in Pakistani’s Balochistan border region; after all, it burnt down the province (Balochistan) in the aftermath of the Mumbai attack in 2008. Pakistan has evidence that the RAW also uses Iran's Chabahar port as a base camp against Balochistan.
Pakistan's big picture with Iran is clear: it has a 900 km border with Tehran so cannot afford Iran as an enemy after hostile Indian and Afghan borders hence is not a beneficiary in annoying Tehran.
Concerns of both sides:
There are concerns both countries would have from each other but they will never force the two countries to cross each other’s red lines: strategic restraint which both countries exercise against each other, and the understanding of each other’s shared limits.
To zoom in here are Iranian concerns:
As Saudi Arabia—Tehran’s arch-rival—will be heavily invested in Balochistan, Gawadar, Iran fears linking Chabahar with the Gawadar may not materialize.
Iran sees the KSA as a sponsor of proxy groups in the border region with Pakistan.
Tehran’s focus on the Persian Gulf and Pakistan’s focus on Afghanistan and India divides Pakistan and Iran on the issues like Yemen, the RAW in Chabahar, for example, and Pakistan’s leadership input for IMCTC.
Fear of opening bridges (covert or partly overt or fully overt) to Israel by Pakistan.
Where is Pakistan concerned?
Iran’s support for the rival Taliban group in Afghanistan to reduce Pakistan’s leverage on the Taliban.
Dislodging Pakistan with the help of India via Chabahar port, in Afghanistan.
Strategic convergence with India allowing the use of ports to attack Pakistan in case Delhi goes to war with Islamabad.
Proding Baloch separatism by looking the other way towards RAW’s heavy footprints in Chabahar.
Use of Lyari gangs: Uzair Baloch’s Iranian passport is a case in point.
Recruitment of Pakistan’s Hazaras youth as a proxy in the Syrian theatre.
Convergence with India and its proxy groups to limit Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and increase India’s presence there.
On both sides, these concerns have a scope to threaten normalization of ties between the two countries; yet both countries have genuinely not allowed them to snowball into a complete rupture in relations; since no border dispute or any strategic hostile intent exists on both sides, there is no big hurdle which should prevent addressing these concerns; one has to appreciate the fact that both countries did not hold some of the concerns against each other for pragmatic reasons in the past.
Almost like every mature country would have some divergence on issues with the other as long as they do not impinge on the national security of the country in question—which is not the case at all in the example of Pakistan and Iran.
Nonetheless, since Iran has an array of countries with very unfriendly to hostile relations, the probability of using non-conventional squeeze is always there leveraging vulnerabilities of Pakistan/Iran border regions. There are even reports of Israelis intelligence targeting Iranian soft and hard pain points from across the Afghan territory.
Pakistan should reach out to Tehran, nevertheless, as it needs to be a reconciliation to prevent further fragmentation of the Muslim world and win over its immediate neighbor; whereas both nations have developed robust bilateral engagement mechanisms to resolve mutual concerns.
It needs to be flagged though, there are certain limits of structural aspects in bilateral ties of the two countries (e.g., close security cooperation with Saudi Arabia precludes such cooperation with Iran). Yet, Pakistan needs good ties with Iran (with only one caveat that it should not be at the cost of the KSA relations).
Iran also cannot afford to turn Pakistan into an enemy given the factors like its current level of hostile relations from the US, Israel to GCC countries, shared border logic, the sanctions challenge, and the opportunity cost for the goodwill Iran enjoys with Pakistan’s second-largest Shia community, which strongly agitates against such a move. So Iran's return to JCPOA and the consequent rehabilitation of Tehran, and Balochistan's new land road networks and opening borders, entry points, and markets are new opportunities to reset the two countries' relations: it will enhance the trade opportunities, link Gawadar with Chbahar will boost the national security of Iran and offer justification for the need to keep less leverage. This is something Pakistan can use to recalibrate its Tehran policy.
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